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Abstract
We use public goods games to experimentally investigate the effect of granularity
(i.e., the degree of divisibility of the space of feasible contribution options) on partic-
ipation (whether individuals contribute or not to the public good) and public goods
provision (total contribution to the public good). Our results show that granularity
has a significant effect on participation, mainly when coarser granularity eliminates
the possibility of small contributions. However, this change in participation does not
lead to a significant change in the total provision of the public good. These results
are aligned with other experimental field results obtained in the context of donations
and fundraising.
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1 Introduction
Many institutions and organizations request contributions from citizens to provide goods
and services that have, to a certain extent, characteristics of public goods: consumption
is non-rival and non-excludable. This is the case of health-related institutions (e.g., the
American Cancer Society, the American Autism Association and their equivalents in other
countries) or environment-related institutions (e.g., Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund,
the Global Footprint Network or SEO Birdlife), among others. Citizens’ contributions
are also acknowledged for the preservation of historical buildings or cultural heritage,
especially after tragedies like the Brazilian National Museum fire in 2018 or the Notre
Dame fire in 2019. The difficulties to obtain public funding for the goals of these health
and environment-related institutions or an insufficient public budget to ensure the proper
maintenance of historical buildings make private donations worth considering.
Leaving aside the contributions of philanthropists and great fortunes, all these insti-
tutions seek to increase fundraising among ordinary citizens; funds that allow them to
provide public goods such as health care research, the preservation of natural resources
and the environment or the maintenance of historical buildings. On many occasions,
however, it is precisely the characteristics of these public goods that make it difficult to
obtain funds: the ordinary citizen acts as a free rider, benefiting from the achievements
without contributing. In this setting, the above institutions look for strategies to increase
fundraising either by increasing the number of individuals who donate and/or increasing
the amount of individual donations.
Most public goods games literature focuses on the level of provision of the public good.
However, participation, understood as the act of contributing any positive amount, has
generally received little attention as an intrinsically valuable end in this literature. Authors
such as Cialdini and Schroeder (1976); Weyant and Smith (1987); Doob and McLaughlin
(1989); Desmet (1999); Martin and Randal (2008) observe, both, participation and pro-
vision of the public good. There are various reasons why the very act of participation
is worthy of consideration: (i) Efficacy of extensive participation in the public good, (ii)
participation as social capital, (iii) signaling, (iv) group identification and monitoring, and
(v) the value of civic virtue.
Efficacy of extensive participation in the public good: The provision of public goods is
typically the result of a sustained act of contribution, such as in the case of charity fund-
raising or management of the commons. In such cases there is a much higher risk that
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the provision of the public good will not persist when it is in the charge of a few major
contributors than when it is the result of an extensive contributive strategy.1 In addition,
there are good reasons to believe that the probability of participating in the future in the
provision of a public good is higher when individuals have already interacted in the past
(see Freedman and Fraser, 1966; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Sobel, 2002; Anderson et al.,
2004)).
Participation as social capital: Since the publication of the studies by Robert Putnam
in the 90’s there has been broad acceptance among sociologists, political scientists and
economists that social capital deserves attention as a source of economic development and
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Grootaert, 2003). There are numerous definitions of
social capital, but all agree that voluntary participation in the configuration of a social
network that serves to share resources and coordinate actions is an inherent characteristic
of social capital. Attributes such as the horizontality of social interaction and trust are
also basic ingredients of social capital. In this sense, participation in the provision of
a public good is, perhaps, the most genuine form of creation of social capital (see, for
instance, the various examples of “community governance” in Bowles and Gintis (2002)).
Without neglecting the importance of the extent of contributions, the very act of
participating has the dichotomous effect of either activating the network connection or not.
Social capital grows when people just participate. In fact, numerous empirical studies use
the scope of participation (in terms of the number of affiliations or membership of voluntary
groups) as an indicator of social capital (see, for example, Putnam, 2000; Anderson et al.,
2004; Carpenter et al., 2004).
Participation in pursuit of the provision of a public good creates a cooperative insti-
tution: The more concentrated the participation the weaker the institution is. Putnam
(1993, 2000) argues that it is extensive networks, rather than narrow and dense ones, that
leads to a cohesive and well-functioning society (see also Leonard et al., 2010). Meinzen-
Dick (1997) and Ostrom (1995) show practical examples of how extensive community
participation overcomes the free riding problem in local and regional projects. Wollebaek
and Selle (2003) find that the scope of involvement in associations is a more powerful
predictor of civil engagement than the intensity of involvement.
1An example of the risk of the provision of a public good depending heavily on large contributors
is the withdrawal of US funding to the WHO following the onset the Covid-19 pandemic. Through
assessed contributions (dues paid by member countries based on income and population) and voluntary
contributions, US contributions account for 20% of the WHO budget (Huang, 2020).
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Signaling: In addition, participation signals individual types. In a standard public goods
game, those who participate, even with small quantities, reveal that they do not belong to
the Homo oeconomicus type. This information can be used to implement redistributive
policies that help assure the future provision of public goods (Andreoni, 1990) or to create
“warm lists” of donors who have previously given, to be considered for future charitable
fund-raising projects (Lange et al., 2007).The frequency of interactions also helps to refine
the expectations of community members in a social environment with frequent cooperation
opportunities (Bowles and Gintis, 2002).
Group identification and monitoring: Fehr and Gachter (2000) find that people who belong
to an identifiable group are more strongly motivated to punish free-riding. The very act
of participation creates a sense of identification and commitment to an end (Wollebaek
and Selle, 2003). One way in which social connections contribute to cooperative social
interaction is, precisely, by providing a vehicle for the multilateral monitoring of free-
riding behavior.
The value of civic virtue: Last but not least, a long tradition in political philosophy
dating back to Aristotle stresses the value of civic virtue, understood as the intrinsic
and instrumental values of participation in politics and social affairs which, typically,
take the form of public goods, such as participation in electoral processes and political
associationism.
Economic and social psychology experiments, both in the lab and in the field, have
provided a methodology to test different alternatives for fundraising and to study how
different factors affect giving behavior in a public goods context. One of the first strategies
that was tested was the legitimization of paltry contributions, also known as the “even a
penny will help” strategy (Cialdini and Schroeder, 1976; Brockner et al., 1984; Weyant and
Smith, 1987; Doob and McLaughlin, 1989; Shearman and Yoo, 2007, among others). This
strategy tests whether legitimizing small donations increases the likelihood of giving and
whether it affects the amount of individual donations. Using a field experiment, Cialdini
and Schroeder (1976) found that small requests lead to a significantly higher frequency
of donations and to no difference in the mean donation per active contributor ending,
therefore, in greater fundraising. Similar results have been obtained by Brockner et al.
(1984) and Shearman and Yoo (2007).
Following this hypothesis, Weyant and Smith (1987) conducted two field experiments
in which donations were requested for the American Society under three conditions: (i)
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standard request for contributions (control treatment); (ii) suggesting small amounts and
(iii) suggesting large amounts. In both experiments, suggesting large amounts decreased
participation, while only in the first experiment suggesting small amounts increased par-
ticipation. On the other hand, the total size of the contributions did not increase or
decrease significantly across the treatments. Doob and McLaughlin (1989) replicated the
same kind of field experiment, but unlike Weyant and Smith (1987) found no difference in
participation.
Another well known strategy is the use of social information about other donors and
donations (Martin and Randal, 2008; Shearman and Yoo, 2007; Croson and Shang, 2008;
Shang and Croson, 2009; Name-Correa and Yildirim, 2016, among others). This strategy
tests whether social information about the giving behavior of others affects the rate of
giving or the amount of the donation. Martin and Randal (2008) performed a field ex-
periment in an art gallery where admission was free but donations could be deposited in
a transparent box. The different treatments consisted in manipulating what was visible
in the donation box: either an empty box, a large amount of coinage, a few $50 bills or
several $5 bills, with the last three containing the same amount of money. By doing so,
they provided signals about the social norm regarding donations. The highest propen-
sity to donate (participation) was obtained in the coinage treatment, but no significant
pairwise differences were found in the total amount collected among the three non-empty
treatments. The authors found that treatments that increase the propensity to donate
reduce the average donation size.
Shearman and Yoo (2007) introduced the social proof condition or the “people like
you are likely to donate” condition and found that including this information increases
active donation in both field and lab experiments. Croson and Shang (2008) used a field
experiment where donors to a radio station who were asked to renew their memberships
received information about another donor’s contribution. Those who received higher social
information than their previous contribution increased their donation, while those who
received lower social information than their previous contribution decreased their donation.
Similar results were obtained by Name-Correa and Yildirim (2016) with a social norm
about donations. This analysis is related to the theory of conditional cooperation in
public good games (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004).
Other studies have examined the effect of suggested donations on contributions (Desmet,
1999; Reiley and Samek, 2015). Desmet (1999) used different scales of suggested contribu-
tions and showed that the donation scale has a real but small effect on both the frequency
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and the amount of donations. Reiley and Samek (2015) analyzed a common practice in
fundraising, namely, to provide a vector of suggested donation amounts to potential donors
in addition to the option of writing in an amount. Using a field experiment, they showed
that higher suggested donation amounts reduce the probability of giving.
Suggested donations is now a widely spread practice. Door-to-door, face-to-face or
phone fundraising have been swallowed up by online fundraising platforms, most of which
provide a vector of suggested donations. Moreover, one of these suggestions is ticked by
default, which can be seen as an anchor point. For example, the American Cancer Society
provides alternative donation amounts of $50, $75, $100 or $250 and then the option of
writing in an amount. The anchor point is $75, as it is the default option.2
Focusing on this last idea, in this work we analyze how granularity affects the par-
ticipation and contribution of individuals involved in a standard public goods game. By
granularity we mean the degree of divisibility subjects are allowed in the space of feasible
contributions to be made by individuals. In particular, we experimentally examine the
effect of granularity in a public goods game by means of four different treatments that
differ in terms of the degree of divisibility in the allowed space of contributions. Granu-
larity differs from the aforementioned suggested donations approach in that the option of
writing in an amount that differs from the suggested amounts is not available. In two of
the treatments, small contributions are possible while in the other two they are not. More-
over, to consider the effect of social information about other donors’ behavior, the game
is played repeatedly, so players have information about the funds collected in previous
contributions.
As regards other works that have used a similar approach to ours, Cadsbya and May-
nesb (1999), Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) and Zhang et al. (2013) compared ex-
treme cases of divisibility in different contexts, that is, the continuous3 versus all-or-
nothing contribution in public goods games. In Cadsbya and Maynesb (1999), the public
goods game had a threshold (minimum total contribution necessary for the provision of the
public good). This introduces the possibility of equilibria different to the pure free riding
equilibrium. The threshold was combined with a money-back guarantee. With respect to
the divisibility issue, the authors found that allowing for continuous contributions facili-
tated the provision of the public good. Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) studied how
2The case of the American Heart Association is similar. The options are $40, $60, $100, $250 or
introduce another amount. The anchor point here is $100. This is a general strategy that can be found in
other institutions like Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund or the Global Footprint Network.
3Almost-continuous in the case of Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009).
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each of the two treatments affects the choice to contribute, where “contribution” means
contributing all in the dichotomous case and contributing more than half of the endowment
in an almost-continuous case. They found that contributions defined in this manner are
higher in the dichotomous case. The cooperative response to peers’ contributions is also
higher in the dichotomous case. The authors do not provide information about the total
provision of the public good. In Zhang et al. (2013), the public goods game is non-linear.
The all-or-nothing contribution is interpreted probabilistically (as the mixed strategy of
contributing all or nothing). They study evolutionary adaptive dynamics in both cases
by means of different simulations, finding that non-linearity is what makes the difference
in the final results. Schniter et al. (2015) studied the continuous versus all-or-nothing
comparison in “trust games”, where the investor decides to invest and the trustee decides
how much to return. Their results show that in the all-or-nothing case investors invest
more but this does not imply that the trustee reciprocates with more money. The treat-
ments that we run in this paper include the all-or-nothing treatment and the continuous
treatment as particular cases.
Our results show that granularity has a relevant effect on participation in public good
provision. The proportion of free riders is higher with coarser granularity, especially when
small donations are not available. However, the experiments also show that this decrease
in participation has no significant effect on the total provision of the public good.
Our findings help to advance understanding of the mechanisms and factors that foster
the efficient provision of public goods. In this sense they are of interest to social planners,
for example to make better predictions when granularity of the contribution space is an
institutional constraint of the problem. The results are also of interest to managers and/or
community members involved in public goods game dilemmas. In particular, they show
that the granularity design makes no difference if total provision is what matters, but does
make a difference if participation has to be promoted.
As a particular case, these results may serve as a guide for charity managers. Charities
crucially depend on private donations, so designing effective messages to attract donors
becomes a central concern, to which substantial resources and effort are devoted. At
individual level, a finer granularity seems to encourage small contributions from those who
would otherwise not have participated, but on the other hand it facilitates the reduction
of contributions from those who would otherwise have participated with more money. The
trade-off is not clear and, probably for this reason, different strategies can be observed in
the day-to-day practice of charities, with a lack of unanimity. At this point, our results
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may help managers to effectively direct their efforts in the correct design of funding request
strategies. The main recommendation in this regard is that, if total revenue is what is
at stake, it is not worth devoting much effort to thinking about the correct ”granularity”
of the request because the overall response seems to be unaffected by it. However, if for
any of the aforementioned reasons, encouraging participation is one of the objectives of
an organization, then facilitating sufficiently small options to contribute is an effective
means.4
The paper is organized as follows. The next section defines the public good experiment
and how granularity is described within the game. Section 3 introduces the experimen-
tal design and procedure and the different treatments that are implemented. Section 4
presents the main results, distinguishing between participation and total provision. Fi-
nally, the conclusions of the experimental analysis are presented in section 5.
2 Granularity in the contribution to public goods
Let us consider a standard public goods game with a group of n agents, i = 1, ..., n, each
of whom has an endowment e. This endowment can be invested in a private project or
in a public project. The private project has a marginal return a for the subject making
the investment and the public project has a marginal return b for all the subjects in the
group, including the one that is investing.
Let X be the space of feasible investment options in the public project. Any investment
option x ∈ X should be x ≤ e in order to be individually affordable. In addition, it is not
possible to make a negative investment in the public project, that is, any option x ∈ X
should be x ≥ 0. In the space of investment options in the public good, x = 0 and x = e
are always available. In this context, we define granularity of the public goods game as the
degree of divisibility of the space of feasible investment options between 0 and e. Thus, the
set [0, e] has a finer granularity than the set {0, e3 ,
2e
3 , e} and this set has a finer granularity
than the set {0, e2 , e}.
Let xit ∈ X be the investment in the public project of subject i in period t. (e− xit)
is the investment in the private project. Therefore, the profit of subject i in period t is




4The meaning of “sufficiently small” is explained more explicitly below.
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We assume that a > b and a < nb, that is, from the individual perspective it is better
to invest in the private project, but from the social (group) perspective it is better to
invest in the public project. Whenever xit = 0, we say that the agent does not participate
in the public project; while if xit > 0, we say that the agent participates in the public
project.
In this setting, the Nash solution is reached when no subject participates in the public
project ( xit = 0 ∀i, ∀t), while the socially efficient solution (maximization of group payoff)
is reached when every subject participates in the public project with the maximum possible
investment (xit = e ∀i, ∀t). Observe that the Nash solution and the social solution are
independent of the granularity.
For those that promote the provision of the public good (public authorities, charitable
organizations, volunteers, etc.), the goal is to maximize the total provision of the public
good, but also to involve or engage citizens in social participation. In our setting, total
provision of the public good can be defined as the total investment in the public good
of a group j. Therefore, total provision of the public project in group j in round t
is TPjt =
∑
i∈j xit. Observe that the maximization of the public good provision also
maximizes the group payoff.
3 Experimental design and procedure
We implement four different treatments, all with the same parametrization except for
the granularity of the set of investment options in the public project (see Table 1). In
treatment ∞ (T∞), the granularity of the set is maximum as the agents can choose any
number between 0 and 12 (the endowment). In treatment 2 (T2), the granularity is
minimum as the agents can only choose between not participating in the public project
and investing all the endowment in the public project.5 In treatments 3 (T3) and 4 (T4),
granularity falls somewhere between these two (3 options and 4 options, respectively). In
all the treatments, the game is played in groups of 4 individuals over 10 rounds. Given
the common parametrization in Table 1, the Nash solution is xit = 0, ∀i,∀t and the social
solution is xit = 12∀i,∀t in every treatment. We say that an individual participates in
public good provision if xit > 0 and does not participate otherwise. In any treatment,
the total provision of the public good of group j in round t is TPjt ∈ [0, 48]. Let zjt
5Among the literature, T∞ and T2 are known as the continuous and the all-or-nothing settings, re-
spectively (Cadsbya and Maynesb (1999), Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) and Zhang et al. (2013)).
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be the number of participants in group j and round t, the average amount of individual




Table 1: Treatments: differences in granularity
Treatment Agents Endowment Investment Marginal return
per group options Private project Public project
T∞ 4 12 xi ∈ [0, 12] 1 0.5
T4 4 12 xi ∈ {0, 4, 8, 12} 1 0.5
T3 4 12 xi ∈ {0, 6, 12} 1 0.5
T2 4 12 xi ∈ {0, 12} 1 0.5
Observe that in T∞ and T4 it is possible to contribute less than half of the endowment
to the public good, that is, small contributions to the public good are possible.6 On the
other hand, in T3 the lower contribution to the public good is half of the endowment, while
the only possible contribution in T2 is the full endowment. By comparing participation in
T∞ and T4 with participation in T3 and T2, it is possible to study the effect of allowing
small donations in public good involvement. Similarly, we can study the effect of such
possibility in the total provision of the public good and average contributions.
At the end of each round, the participants received summary information about in-
vestment decisions and consequences in that round: own investment in the public project,
total investment of the group in the public project (i.e., total provision) and own earnings
in the round. With this information, the participant receives social information about
others’ contribution to the public good. The behavior of the participants in subsequent
rounds allows us to analyze whether this social information affects future participation
and/or contribution to the public good.
We ran four different sessions (one per treatment) that were conducted using the
z-tree program (Fischbacher, 2007) at Lineex; an experimental lab located in Valencia
(Spain). There were 32 participants (8 groups) per treatment, which made for a total of
128 participants. During the experiment, the public project and the private project were
called project A and project B, respectively. Subjects were told that the points obtained
during the experiment would be exchanged for cash at a pre-specified exchange rate at the
end of the experiment. After completing the ten-rounds of investments, the participants
completed a short, 15-item Raven test.7 The average payoff was e20.19, the minimum
payoff was e13.80 and the maximum payoff was e25.30.
6In treatment T∞ contributions in fractions of units were permitted, so it was possible to contribute
less than 1.
7The participants received a payment of 0.25 Euros per correct answer.
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4 Results
4.1 Participation in public projects
We have already defined participation in the public project as an investment xit ≥ 0.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of agents that participated in the public project in each
of the four treatments for the different rounds. As can be seen, in the four treatments
participation in the public project decreases with repetition. In addition, we can observe
that participation seems to be lower when the granularity of the set of investment options
in the public project is coarser, except for T∞ and T4 where the participation levels are
quite similar.
Figure 1: Proportion of agents that participate in the public project
Statistically, there are significant differences in the proportion of participants (Kruskal-
Wallis test χ2 = 21.525, p-value = 0.0000), therefore we can say that granularity makes a
difference in participation in public projects. Additionally, if we compare the treatments
by pairs, we find some interesting results. In T∞ and T4 the proportion of participants
is quite similar; the decrease in granularity from T∞ to T4 is not enough to affect par-
ticipation. However, participation decreases significantly when we compare T∞ with T3
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and T∞ with T2 and when we compare T4 with T3 and T4 with T2 (see Mann-Whitney
tests in table 2). The differences in participation are not significant when we compare T3
and T2.
Table 2: Proportion of participants. Mann-Whitney tests.
Treatment T∞ T4 T3 T2







Note: p-value in parentheses
Therefore, T∞ and T4 are quite similar in participation and something similar happens
with T3 and T2. Recall that in T3 and T2 granularity prevents small investments as it is
not possible to invest an amount lower than half the endowment in the public project, that
is, an amount xi such that 0 < xi <
e
2 . In T∞ and T4, granularity is less restrictive and
allows investments below half the endowment. Granularity proves to have a significant
effect on participation only if we compare a set of contribution possibilities in which small
donations are not available with a set of contribution possibilities in which small donations
are available.
However, there seem to be more factors than granularity and small donations in deter-
mining participation: in the different treatments, agents decide whether to participate in
the public project or not over ten rounds, and most of them change their decisions at least
once although the granularity context is the same in every round. If we consider the four
treatments, only 14% of the agents always participate and just 1.56% never participate.
The rest of the subjects change their participation decision at least once. In Figure 2 the
participants are distributed according to frequency of participation, from 0 to 10 times. In
the treatment with finer granularity, T∞, a high proportion of agents (almost 40%) always
participates. In T4, where granularity is smaller but contributions of less than half the
endowment are available, most agents participate at least 8 times. The frequency of par-
ticipation is clearly lower in treatments T3 and T2. As expected, a sort of single-peaked
shape is observed in all figures, with a “shifting” of the peak (or modal participation)
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towards a more frequent participation as the granularity increases. In T∞ the “peak” is
at 10; in T4 it is at 8; in T3 it is around 6 and in T2 it is around 4. Interestingly, in the
four cases, participating one or twice tends to “break” the single-peaked shape. A possible
explanation for this is that one-off participations as a way of false signaling during the
game are a kind of focal strategy.
Figure 2: Participation per subject
To analyze which factors may determine the likelihood of participation in a public
project, let us define a dichotomous variable, Zijt ∈ {0, 1}. Zijt = 1 if agent i in group j
participates in the public project in round t, while Zijt = 0 if agent i in group j does not
participate in the public project in round t. Using a probit model with standard deviations
clustered by groups, we estimate P (Z = 1|x) where x is the vector of explanatory variables.
Since participation decisions are made repeatedly over 10 rounds they could be time
dependent. Therefore, the first explanatory variable is participation in the previous round,
Zijt−1. In addition, participation in public projects can be affected by the behavior of oth-
ers (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004; Martin and Randal, 2008; Shearman
and Yoo, 2007). To study whether group behavior affects participation, we distinguish
between relative and absolute contribution to public projects. After each round of the
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game, each subject receives information about total public good contribution from his/her
group (absolute contribution). The subject can see how much of the public good is due
to his/her contribution and how much to the contribution of others (relative contribu-
tion). We include as explanatory variables the relative contribution of others: propor-






and the absolute total provision of the public good from group j
in round (t− 1), TPjt−1 =
∑
i xijt−1.
The possible effect of granularity on participation decisions is analyzed by including
dummies for the different treatments. DT4i is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
for T4 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we define DT3i and DT2i.
On the other hand, cognitive abilities can be relevant in the strategy used by par-
ticipants in social settings (Benito-Ostolaza et al., 2016; Gill and Prowse, 2016). Those
with greater cognitive abilities better understand the intricacies of the game and this un-
derstanding can affect their strategy. In order to measure these cognitive abilities, the
participants in the experiment completed a short 15-item Raven test.8 To capture this
possible effect, we include the Raven score as an explanatory variable.
We also include dummies for the round in order to test whether repetition determines
the probability of participation.
As can be seen, having participated previously in a public project has a positive and
significant effect on the probability of participating. However, a look at the dummies for
the rounds also reveals that repeated requests to participate have a negative effect on the
probability of participation: The marginal effects are negative in all the rounds, but those
effects are only significant from round 6 on. That is, continued requests to participate in
public goods projects may participation less likely in the medium/long run.
Group behavior also reveals interesting results. The relative contribution of others
has a significant, positive marginal effect, while absolute total provision has no significant
effect on participation. In individual decisions whether to participate in the provision of
public goods, the contributions made by the reference group may be decisive in relative
terms, that is, when compared to one’s own contribution. This effect is independent of
the absolute provision by the group.
Regarding our main question of the effect of granularity on participation decisions,
8The Raven test is a nonverbal multiple-choice intelligence test for abstract reasoning, (Raven, 1936).
In each item of the test, the participant is asked to identify the missing element that completes a visual
pattern. This test is recognized as a leading measure of analytic intelligence (see Brañas Garza et al., 2012;
Carpenter et al., 1990; Gray and Thompson, 2004, for detailed information).
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Table 3: Marginal effects of the determinants of participation
Variable Marginal effect p-value
Participation in (t− 1) 0.4120*** 0.0000
Relative contribution of others in (t− 1) 0.3415** 0.0141
Absolute total provision in (t− 1) 0.0003 0.8540
Treatment T4 -0.0234 0.7028
Treatment T3 -0.1628*** 0.0077
Treatment T2 -0.2417*** 0.0004
Raven score -0.0386*** 0.0000
Round 3 0.0004 0.9953
Round 4 -0.0318 0.5644
Round 5 -0.0677 0.3127
Round 6 -0.1292** 0.0283
Round 7 -0.1208** 0.0129
Round 8 -0.2078*** 0.0016
Round 9 -0.1616** 0.0320
Round 10 -0.2308*** 0.0000
Observations N 1152
Notes: Probit regressions. Standard deviations clustered by groups (32 groups). * Significant at
10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
the regression results confirm what the data in the figure seem to indicate: A decrease in
granularity has a negative effect on the probability of participation. However, only the
negative effects of DT3 and DT2 are statistically significant. Treatments, T4, T3 and T2
all show a notable reduction in granularity compared to T∞, T4 still allow contributions
of less than half the endowment while T3 and T2 do not permit such small donations.
Therefore, coarser granularity negatively affects participation when small donations are
not available.
Another factor that negatively affects the probability of participation is the cognitive
abilities measured by the Raven test. Those who have greater cognitive abilities according
to the Raven score have a significantly lower probability of participating in the public
project. The probability of being a free rider in a public good context increases with
cognitive abilities.
The conclusion reached is that granularity is a relevant factor in decisions as to whether
to participate in public goods, especially when granularity eliminates what can considered
as small donations. Coarser granularity decreases the probability of participation. It is
also interesting to highlight that the relative contribution within the group (me versus the
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others) is a relevant factor for subsequent participations regardless of the absolute level of
provision achieved by the group: A higher relative contribution from others (or a lower
relative own contribution) increases the probability of participation.
4.2 Total provision
We have already seen that reducing the granularity of the possible investment options
may reduce participation in a public project, mainly if it does not include small dona-
tions. However, another goal in public goods settings is the maximization of public good
provision. The open question is whether granularity and the inclusion or not of small do-
nations have an effect on the total provision of a public good. Figure 3 shows the average
total provision in each treatment over the different rounds. Recall that TPjt ∈ [0, 48] for
all groups and treatments.
Figure 3: Average total provision of the public good
The first visual impression shows that, despite the differences in participation, the
total provision in the different treatments does not differ. This seems to indicate that
granularity is not a determinant factor in total public good provision. A Kruskal-Wallis
test (χ2 = 1.3759, p − value = 0.7112) confirms this visual impression; we cannot reject
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the null hypothesis that total provision in the four treatments has the same underlying
distribution. Moreover, there are no statistical differences between treatments when we
compare them by pairs (see Mann-Whitney test in Table 4). Therefore, we can also say
that the inclusion or not of small donations in the contribution set does not affect total
provision of the public good. It is worth mentioning that, on average, total provision is
far below the maximum possible amount. In the first periods, it is around 60% of the
maximum, but in the last periods it is just 30% of the maximum.
Table 4: Total provision. Mann-Whitney tests.
Treatment T∞ T4 T3 T2







Note: p-value in parentheses
Let us now consider the relationship between participation and total provision. We
observe two different facts. On the one hand, there is no difference between treatments
concerning the total provision of the public good, that is, the significant differences ob-
served in participation between treatments are not clearly reflected in the total provision
of the public good. On the other hand, the decrease in participation over time observed
in all the treatments is clearly reflected in the total provision of the public good: within
each treatment, a decrease in participation is correlated with a decrease in total provi-
sion. Figure 4 shows the differences in participation per treatment and per round and the
differences in total provision per treatment and per round.
In order to analyze the determinants of total provision in this setting, we resorted to
a regression analysis. The dependent variable is total provision per group and, as possible
determinants, we include the following independent variables. First, granularity. For this
purpose, we include the dummies to distinguish the granularity between treatments: DT4j
takes the value of 1 if group j plays T4 and value 0 otherwise. Similarly, we define DT3j
and DT2j . Given the previous analysis, we expect this factor to have no significant effect
on total provision. The behavior of others can influence not only the participation of the
17
Figure 4: Total provision versus participation
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subjects, as we have previously considered, but also the contribution size and hence the
total provision (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004; Martin and Randal, 2008).
As we are considering total provision, we include as an explanatory variable the lag total
provision, TPjt−1. Again, the cognitive abilities of the participants can be a determinant
factor in investment strategies and hence in the total provision. In order to measure the
cognitive abilities of the group, we construct the variable Raven group, RGj . The value
of this variable is the sum of the Raven score for all the members of the group. We also
include a set of dummy variables to account for the possible effect of time and repetition
on total provision.
We use a censored regression model, a Tobit model, as it is designed to estimate
linear relationships between variables when there is either left or right censoring in the
dependent variable (0 and 48, respectively, when the dependent variable is total provision).
The results are shown in Table 5. We also include the results of an OLS regression.
As expected, the coefficients of the variables DT4j , DT3j , DT2j are not statistically
significant, that is, granularity has no effect on the total provision. However, the lag
total provision has a positive and significant effect on current total provision. Cognitive
abilities contribute negatively to the total provision. In those groups where the sum of the
Raven scores of the group members is higher, total provision is lower (see the negative and
significant coefficient of RGj in Table 5). The time variables have negative coefficients
from round 5 on, but the negative effect of repetition in total provision is only significant
from round 6 on. Observe that there are no significant differences in total provision due
to repetition between the first five rounds. There is then a drop due to repetition which
is maintained until the last round where the drop is more pronounced (the coefficients of
rounds 7, 8 and 9 are quite similar and the coefficient in round 10 is higher).
Observing these experimental results, granularity, whether it contains small donations
or not, is not a relevant factor in the total provision of public goods. We can observe
that the effect on participation is balanced with a greater average amount of individual
contribution. These average amounts of individual contributions are shown in Figure 5.
The highest average amount of individual contribution is found in T2 (coarser granularity),
while the lowest one occurs in T∞ (finer granularity).
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Total provision in (t− 1) 0.351*** 0.320***
(0.061) (0.057)
Treatment T4 0.652 0.776
(1.744) (1.773)
Treatment T3 -0.233 -0.165
(1.894) (1.809)
Treatment T2 -0.238 0.302
(2.659) (2.373)
Raven group -0.501*** -0.419**
(0.185) (0.162)
Round 3 1.350 1.089
(2.589) (2.446)
Round 4 0.163 0.372
(2.071) (2.042)
Round 5 -3.447 -3.393
(2.738) (2.506)
Round 6 -5.194*** -4.935***
(1.911) (1.827)
Round 7 -7.477*** -7.053***
(1.802) (1.721)
Round 8 -7.421*** -7.104***
(2.088) (2.512)
Round 9 -7.084*** -6.685***
(2.549) (2.388)
Round 10 -10.529*** -9.824***
(2.388) (2.243)
Observations N 288 288
Notes: Standard errors clustered by groups. Standard errors in parenthesis. *
Significant at 10% level,** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Figure 5: Average amount of individual contributions
5 Discussion and conclusions
Our results under all the treatments reproduce the widely spread experimental evidence
that participation in and provision of the public good decrease with repetition in a standard
repeated public goods game, but without reaching the Nash equilibrium. The main focus
of this paper is, however, the effect of granularity on both participation in and provision
of the public good.
Participation tends to decrease together with coarser granularity, but the differences
are only significant when the reduction of granularity is large enough. What seems to
make a difference is whether small positive contributions (below half of the endowment)
are available or not. Interestingly, there are no significant pairwise differences between
treatments T3 and T2: adding the possibility of contributing 6 when only 0 or 12 was
available does not seem to have any effect on participation. Similarly, there are no differ-
ences between treatments T∞ and T4. Once the agent has the possibility to contribute
in the set {0, 4, 8, 12}, enriching the set to allow any amount between 0 and 12 does not
have an effect on participation either. Thus, participation seems to be encouraged only
if there is some option below half of the endowment. If this is ensured, then it does not
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matter how many options below the half are added.
A second important finding is that granularity does not have a significant effect on the
total provision of the public good. In general, this is aligned with the results of Cialdini and
Schroeder (1976); Brockner et al. (1984); Martin and Randal (2008); Shearman and Yoo
(2007); Weyant and Smith (1987) in the context of donations, who showed that requesting
or suggesting small quantities encourage the act of giving but not greater fundraising.
A more detailed comparison with Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) is in order,
given that they also perform a standard public good experiment with 4 players where
two treatments ((U)nrestricted and (R)estricted) coincide with our treatments T∞ and
T2. The data provided in Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) shows that, as in our
study, the number of people who contribute a positive amount increases significantly in
the U-treatment. However, they neither provide nor indeed mention any data on total
contribution, so there is no way to make any comparison in this respect.
Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) and our study also differ in the target variables
studied. They do not focus on participation as we understand it (contributing any positive
amount), but on what they call “cooperation”, understood as contributing more than
half of the endowment in treatment U and the whole endowment in treatment R. They
find that the R-domain significantly raises this kind of cooperation (from 12% to 24% of
total actions). According to our data, unlike Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) results,
the number of subjects who contribute more than half of their endowment in T∞ (the
equivalent to U) is not much smaller than in T2 (the equivalent to R). The specific figures
are 39% of the total number of actions in T∞ and 44% in T2.
An important difference between the design of Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009)
and ours is that in their work the game is repeated 20 times (comnpared to 10 times in our
experiment). This plausibly explains the lower rate of contributive actions in Gangadharan
and Nikiforakis (2009), though it is not clear how it may relate to the differences between
treatments that they observe regarding contributive actions, which are not observed in
our study.
Thus, the two main findings in this work are that granularity does affect participation
when small quantities are available, but the effect on the total provision of the public
good is not significant. The combination of both can be interpreted in different ways. The
first is that increasing participation by means of small amounts is insufficient to have a
significant effect on the total provision of the good. The results can also be interpreted
from the viewpoint of restricted intermediate contributions. In this regard, the effect on
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those who are unable to choose the intermediate option and decide to contribute the higher
one (12 instead of 6, for example) is set off by the effect on those who decide to contribute
the immediately smaller one (0 instead of 6). A bit more sophisticated explanation is that
individual decisions at each period are the result of linear mixed strategies. For example,
agents who contribute 7 in the continuous treatment (T∞) would have contributed 12
with a probability of p = 7/12 and 0 with a probability of 1−p = 5/12 in the dichotomous
case (T2). In other words, individuals adapt to the scarcity of options by using mixed
strategies whose expected value is independent of the granularity of the set. Therefore,
when the behavior of all agents is aggregated, no differences are observed in the average
contribution among the different granularity treatments. A natural development of our
experiment would set up the game with a larger group of people (for example 10 people
instead of 4). In this case a larger share of small cooperators might be able to win out in
the trade-off with no participation by defectors.9
The experiment also yields some other results in line with the abundant experimental
evidence on the factors that affect participation and contribution in standard public goods
games, such as the negative effect of cognitive abilities and the negative effect of time
(especially in the last rounds). The results also show that previous group contribution
to public goods has a positive effect on current total contribution. However, relative
contributions seem to be more significant than absolute total provision when deciding
whether to participate.
As a general conclusion, there does not appear to be strong support for a finer granular
design of the public goods game if the aim is to increase the total provision of the public
good. However, if promoting participation is among the designer or social planner’s goals,
then a finer granularity would contribute to achieving this aim, especially if it allows for
small contributions.
Our findings help advance the extensive research program devoted to understanding
the mechanisms that foster participation in and provision of public goods. They might
be of interest to social planners to improve their understanding of these problems and
make better predictions, especially when the granularity of the space of contributions is
at stake.10 The results also show managers and/or community members involved in a
public goods game that the granularity design does not seem to make a difference if total
9We thank an anonymous referee for this idea.
10Social planners may possibly have other reasons for facilitating richer spaces of contribution which
rely, for example, on theories that defend the intrinsically attainable value of having freedom of choice
(see, for example, Sen, 1988; Pattanaik and Xu, 1990; Gravel, 1994; Bartling et al., 2014).
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provision is what matters, but does if participation has to be promoted.
The results are also applicable to the particular case of charity funding. Our results
may help managers find more efficient resource allocations for the design of requesting
strategies. If total revenue is the central objective then any effort devoted to the design
of granularity is futile, but if broad participation is sought then granularity matters. In
particular, providing some sufficiently small opportunities to contribute (in our experiment
this means a contribution of less than half the total endowment) is enough to encourage
participation.
Moreover, our results show that continual requests for participation may make partic-
ipation less likely in the medium/long run (in our experiments this happens from the 6-th
round on). For example, if there is an interest in using “warm lists”, managers should
know that such lists may have a limited effective lifetime.
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choice, Recherches Économiques de Louvain/Louvain Economic Review 56(3-4): 383–
390.
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community,
Simon and Schuster.
Raven, J. (1936). Mental tests used in generic studies: The performance of related in-
dividuals on tests mainly educative and mainly reproductive (M.Sc. thesis), London:
University of London.
Reiley, D. and Samek, A. (2015). How do suggested donations affect charitable gifts?
evidence from a fiels experiment in public broadcasting, SPI Working Paper Series,
Universty of Chicago 142-SPI.
27
Schniter, E., Sheremeta, R. and Shields, T. (2015). The problem with all-or-nothing trust
games: What others choose not to do matters in trust-based exchange, MPRA Paper
No. 68561.
Sen, A. (1988). Freedom of choice: concept and content, European Economic Review
32(2-3): 269–294.
Shang, J. and Croson, R. (2009). A field experiment in charitable contribution: the impact
of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods, The Economic Journal
119: 1422–1439.
Shearman, S. and Yoo, J. (2007). “even a penny will help”: legitimization of paltry dona-
tion and social proof in soliciting donation to a charitable organization, Communication
Research Reports 24(4): 271–282.
Sobel, J. (2002). Can we trust social capital?, Journal of economic literature 40(1): 139–
154.
Weyant, J. and Smith, S. (1987). Getting more by asking for less: The effects of request
size on donations of charity, Journal of Applied Social Psychology 17(4): 392–400.
Wollebaek, D. and Selle, P. (2003). Participation and social capital formation: Norway in
a comparative perspective 1, Scandinavian Political Studies 26(1): 67–91.
Zhang, Y., Fu, F., Wu, T., Xie, G. and L., W. (2013). A tale of two contribution mecha-
nisms for nonlinear public goods, Scientific Reports 3(2021): 1–5.
28
